We address an optimization problem in which two agents, each with a set of weighted items, compete in order to maximize the total weight of their winning sets. The latter are built according to a sequential game consisting in a fixed number of rounds. In every round each agent submits one item for possible inclusion in its winning set. We study two natural rules to decide the winner of each round.
Introduction
We consider a multi-agent problem where agents compete to fill a joint solution set with their items. We focus on the following situation: There are two agents, each of them owning one of two disjoint sets of weighted items. The agents have to select items from their set for putting them in a solution set. This process proceeds in a fixed number of rounds. In every round each of the two agents selects exactly one of its items and submits the item for possible inclusion in the solution set. A central decision mechanism chooses one of the items as "winner" of this round. The winning item is permanently included in the solution set. We consider two versions of the problem, depending whether the losing item is permanently discarded or can be reused in the succeeding rounds. Each agent wants to maximize its total solution value which is given by the total weight of its items included in the solution set. We assume complete information, i.e. both agents know all items' weights.
Related literature
The problem we address can be regarded as a single-suit card game in which each of two players chooses a card from its hand. The highest value card wins and each card can be used only once. In [11] the authors study a zero-sum game in which the cards are submitted simultaneously and the players want to maximize the total value of the won cards. In [8, 12] the so called whistette game is addressed. There is a totally ordered suit of 2n cards, distributed between the two players. The player who has the lead plays first on each trick. The player with the higher card wins a trick and obtains the lead. Players want to maximize the number of won tricks.
Moreover, seeds assignment in team sport tournaments, e.g. chess leagues, is indeed related to the problem we deal with in this paper. The players of each team are ordered and each player faces the opponent on the same ordered position of the other teams' list. However, the ordering of players may be restricted to obey an established ranking (e.g. ELO points) to some extent. There the objective is to maximize the number of wins while our problem aims at the maximization of the total weight of all winning rounds.
Another problem strictly related to ours and the above described seeds assignment is addressed in [9] , where the authors investigate optimal strategies on how to choose a player (item) for the next match (round) in a game consisting of a sequence of matches. Two types of games are considered, given a winning probability for every pair of competing players. In the first type, after each match, the loser is eliminated from the list of remaining players while the winner remains in the list. In the second type, both players are eliminated after each match.
In addition, our problem can be viewed as a special knapsack game where two agents try to fit their items in a bounded common solution set in order to maximize their profits. In our case, we have a unit size for the items and a special mechanism to decide which items fit, i.e. are accepted in the common knapsack. Although the problem that we address in this work is relatively new, 0-1 knapsack problems (KP) in a multi-decision environment have been considered in the literature for two decades: from game-theoretic to auction applications there is a variety of papers dealing with this classical combinatorial optimization problem. Hereafter, we limit to report a few of them.
A related problem in which different players try to fit their own items in a common knapsack is the so called knapsack sharing problem studied by several authors (see for instance [6, 7] ). A single objective function that tries to balance the profits among the players is considered in a centralized perspective. Another interesting game, based on the maximum 0-1 knapsack, interpreted as a special on-line problem, is addressed in [10] where a two person zerosum game, called knapsack game, is considered. Knapsack problems are also addressed in the context of auctions. For instance, in [1] , an application for selling advertisements on Internet search engines is considered. In particular, there are n agents wishing to place an item in the knapsack and each agent gives a private valuation for having an item in the knapsack, while each item has a publicly known size. Finally, in [3] , a two-agent knapsack problem where one agent (the leader) controls the capacity of a knapsack, and the other (follower) solves the resulting knapsack problem, is tackled by dynamic programming techniques. Note that the case of a single agent was extensively treated in [5] .
Formal Problem Setting
In the following, A resp. B indicate the agents' names each of them owning a set of n items, where item i has weight a i resp. b i . Throughout this paper we assume the items to be sorted in decreasing order of weights, i.e. a 1 ≥ a 2 ≥ . . . ≥ a n resp. b 1 ≥ b 2 ≥ . . . ≥ b n . Sometimes we will identify items by their weight. All information about the input list of items is public.
The game is performed over c rounds. In each round both of the two agents simultaneously submit one of their items, say a i and b j . We consider the two most natural rules for deciding which of the two submitted items wins and is added to the solution set.
Moreover, under both rules, we deal with two different scenarios.
Single-use items: each losing item is discarded and can not be submitted a second time;
Reusable items: each losing item can be reused for submission in the succeeding rounds.
In conclusion, we tackle four different versions of the competitive subset selection problem (CSS), which we denote as CSS(α, β), where α ∈ {R1, R2} depending on the rule in force and β ∈ {single, reuse} depending on the treatment of the losing items.
This problem can be represented by a graph model. Each agent's item is associated to a node of a weighted complete bipartite graph
). An arc (i, j) belongs to E A or to E B depending on the winner of a comparison of a i and b j , which of course depends on the applied selection rule.
Every pair of items (a i , b j ) submitted simultaneously in one round can be represented by an arc (i, j) between the two corresponding nodes. Hence, any solution may be represented as a set M of c arcs on G. The total weight of items in the solution for agent A is given by w
Note that, in case of single-use items, the set M is a matching on G of cardinality c. Thus, determining a global optimum maximizing the sum of the two agents' weights can be done in polynomial time by solving a weighted cardinality assignment problem [4] . Yet, when losing items are reusable, M may not be a matching, however it is easy to describe the set of feasible solutions using a linear program, whose set of constraints is a proper subset of the constraints used for the single-use items case.
Indeed, in Section 2, we show that the global optimum for all versions of CSS can be found in a straightforward way, without recurring to matching techniques or linear programming.
Our results
The problem we deal with in this paper is viewed from different perspectives. We first consider it from a centralized point of view as a bicriteria optimization problem and study the structure of efficient, i.e. Pareto optimal (PO) solutions (Section 2). We give bounds on the ratio between the efficient so-lutions with largest and smallest total weight (Section 2.2) and characterize the computational complexity of finding one and/or all Pareto optimal solutions (Section 2.1). Moreover, we discuss the existence of Nash equilibria (Section 2.3).
In addition, in Section 3, we address the problem from a single agent perspective. We consider the problem of optimizing the objective of one agent when partial information on the sequence of items submitted by the other is given. We consider two different scenarios: In the first one, the sequence of the second agent is completely unknown, and one seeks for strategies that maximize the weight of the first agent in the worst case (Section 3.1). In game theory literature, this is often referred to as a maximin strategy. In the second scenario, the items submitted by the other agent are known in advance in each round and we propose best response strategies for the first agent (Section 3.2).
Our results are summarized in Table 1 . Although most of the results for the reusable items scenario are similar to those of the single-use items case and can be shown by slightly modifying the arguments, there are a few interesting differences between the two scenarios. 
Efficient solutions and equilibria
In this section we investigate the solution structure in an offline perspective, i.e. we consider the problem from a centralized and static point of view and look for Pareto efficient solutions. Then, we show that under both rules, no Nash equilibria exist, in general.
Pareto Efficient Solutions
Using the same terminology as in multicriteria optimization, a solution M is called Pareto efficient or simply efficient or nondominated if there exist no solution M such that w
We start our investigation with Rule 1 and notice that in this case each agent always submits its c largest items. Indeed, submitting voluntarily smaller items the attained total weight would be dominated by switching to the larger items. So, in the remainder of this section, without loss of generality, under Rule 1 we assume c = n. By a simple pair interchange argument it is easy to see that in this case the solution where A (B resp.) wins with its heaviest k (c − k resp.) items is also feasible. Clearly, it is also nondominated. If k ≥ 1, the structure of the resulting solution is such that item a i is matched A straightforward consequence of the above result is that, finding the global optimum, i.e. the solution M * for which w
is maximum, can be done in a simple way in polynomial time also without solving a matching problem, since M c items to submit among the n available. Picking only large items may results in too many losses, a restriction to the smallest items increases the chances to win many rounds but the gain from these victories may be quite small. Hence, we first restrict our attention to the case c = n. In this case we can show the following results for the case with single-use items.
Theorem 3 For c = n Problem CSS(R2, single) may have an exponential number of efficient solutions.
Consider the following example for some small ε > 0. We now show that, in the single-use items case under Rule 2, the problem of deciding whether a certain given objective for each agent can be achieved is N P-complete by reduction from Partition. This implies that finding efficient solutions under Rule 2 is in general an N P-hard task. To this purpose, we consider the following decision problem. 
PROOF. Consider an instance I of Partition with integer valued items
For T > v n and ε < 1/(n + 1), build an instance I of Recognition CSS(R2, single) as follows:
Let I be a YES-instance of Partition. Then it is easy to build a solution M of I such that w
The required solution M is given as follows: Each item i of A with i ∈ S is matched to the corresponding item i of B, while each item j of B with j ∈S is matched to
Clearly, the two agents total weights are: w 
Observe that the above proof shows that the problem is N P-hard even if c = n, i.e. the items to be submitted do not have to be selected from a larger ground set.
Although finding efficient solutions for CSS(R2, single) is N P-hard, the global optimum M * can be found in polynomial time using matching techniques [4] as already mentioned in Section 1.2. However, it is easy to see that for any value of c ≤ n, we may compute a global optimal solution in a straightforward way by setting
will lose with item a 1 in any case and B can score its largest possible gain. This argument can be repeated over all rounds.
Differently from above, in case of reusable items under Rule 2 finding Pareto efficient solutions becomes an easy task since the choice of the losing items has no consequence. For c = n the case k = 0 is impossible since A will for sure win the round where B submits b 1 .
Best-Worst Ratio
In this section we give an estimate on the ratio between the global optimum, i.e. the best efficient solution, and the value of any efficient solution. This concept is somehow connected to the notion of the price of anarchy, studied in algorithmic game theory, which is usually defined as the worst possible ratio between the value of the global (social) optimum and the value of a solution derived by a selfish optimization.
Here, we adopt a slightly different notion, called best-worst ratio defined as
where E is the set of efficient solutions and w * is the global optimum value.
In the following, we show that this ratio can be arbitrarily high for Problems CSS(R2, single), CSS(R1, reuse), and CSS(R2, reuse) with c < n, while for Problems CSS(R1, single) and CSS(R2, reuse) with c = n this ratio is limited. 
, the statement follows.
To show that the bound of 2 can be reached, consider the following example for a large constant T . Therefore, for T tending to infinity, the best-worst ratio tends to 2.
Theorem 9 The best worst ratio of Problem CSS(R2, reuse) when n = c is c.
PROOF. Assuming n = c and b 1 > a 1 , there can be only c efficient solutions, since A must win at least one round, namely when B plays b 1 (see Theorem 6) .
Each of the c efficient solutions has a total weight
It follows from the sorting of the weights and the definition of j that w k ≥ a 1 and w k ≤ c a 1 for all k = 1, . . . , c. Hence, the best worst ratio can be at most c.
To show that the bound of Theorem 9 is tight consider Example 10.
Example 10
If B sticks to submitting b 1 it always looses which yields an efficient solution with total weight Example 11 above shows that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 12 The best-worst ratio of Problem CSS(R2, reuse) if n > c can be arbitrarily high.
Data of Example 8 and Example 11 can be used to show that the following theorem holds for c = n and c < n, respectively.
Theorem 13 The best-worst ratio of Problem CSS(R2, single) can be arbitrarily high.
Consider now the following example.
Example 14
Let c = 2, there are only two efficient solutions. Agent A submits items a 1 , a 2 or a 2 , a 2 . In the first case the global solution value is T +2, while in the second it is 4. Therefore, for T tending to infinity, the best-worst ratio is unbounded.
Example 14 above shows that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 15
The best-worst ratio of CSS(R1, reuse) can be arbitrarily high.
Nash Equilibria
It is easy to show that when losing items cannot be reused, under both rules, no Nash equilibria exist, except for trivial instances where only one Pareto optimum exists. The following example presents an instance in which there are no Nash equilibria in case of single-use items.
Example 16
There are c = n = 2 rounds. When dealing with the reusable items case under Rule 1, the results are different. When both agents follow a greedy strategy (i.e. in each round, submit the largest available item) they reach a global optimum and the c overall largest items win. This solution correspond to a Nash equilibrium, since there is no convenience for one agent to deviate from the greedy strategy when the other agent follows the same greedy strategy.
In conclusion, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 17 Problem CSS(R1, reuse) admits a Nash equilibrium.
It is an open question to determine a Nash equilibrium, if it exists, for Problem CSS(R2, reuse).
Strategies of Agents
In this section we address the problem of devising a strategy, that is an algorithm that suggests an agent which item to submit at each round, in order to maximize the agent's weight under different information scenarios.
When dealing with the case where each item could be submitted only once (single-use-items case), the definition of a strategy of an agent is quite simple. It could be represented by an ordered list of c different items, called submission list, or by an algorithm producing it. Clearly, any such list is a feasible strategy.
When items are reusable and thus may appear several times in a submission list, its feasibility depends on the submissions of the other agent, since items cannot be reused after winning a round. Thus, no static list of items can be given as a strategy. Instead, we choose to define a strategy by an algorithm which generates the list of items submitted in every round depending on the currently still available items.
Here we consider two different "knowledge scenarios" for an agent, say B. In the first one, the strategy of agent A is completely unknown and we look for an algorithm guaranteeing the maximum weight in the worst possible case for B (maximin strategy). We show that for Rule 2 non-trivial algorithms can be developed while under Rule 1 it only remains for B to submit its largest items.
In the second scenario, agent B gets to know the item submitted by agent A in every round before making its own move. We will try to answer the question how B should select its items under such an advantageous asymmetry of information. In this particular context, the strategy adopted by agent B is referred to as best response strategy. Somewhat surprisingly, it will turn out that, in the single-use items case, for Rule 2 (CSS(R2, single)) an optimal best response strategy can be found while for Rule 1 (CSS(R1, single)) the existence of such a strategy can be ruled out even if an algorithm with an a priori guarantee on the quality of the solution can be found. An analogous result can be proven for the reusable items case under Rule 1 (CSS (R1, reuse) ).
Maximin Strategies
In order to formally introduce the concept of maximin strategy, we give the following definitions. Let S A (S B ) be the set of strategies for agent A (B). 
Theorem 18 MaximinSingle 2 is a maximin strategy for CSS(R2, single).
PROOF. At first we will show that for an arbitrary set S(B) submitted by B, the result of agent A acting in a malicious way aiming at minimizing the total gain of B will always lead to a bipartitioning of S(B) such that A wins against the largest k items and looses against the remaining smallest c − k items of Secondly, we show that it is always better (or at least not worse) for B to select a subset of items consisting of a consecutive subsequence of items from {1, . . . , n}. Indeed, following from the above bipartition argument B wins all items smaller than some b k and thus should always submit the largest c − k items with weight ≤ b k to maximize its gain, i.e. a consecutive interval. Moreover, since B will lose all items with weight ≥ b k , B can just as well submit the smallest k−1 items among these, yielding all together a consecutive interval.
It remains to compute the best such interval. Algorithm When dealing with maximin strategies, the possibility of reusing losing items, differently from what observed in the single-use items case, gives an agent more possibilities to maximize its weight in the worst case. We first consider Rule 1 and provide the following simple greedy algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for agent B performing a maximin strategy for problem CSS(R1, reuse).

MaximinReuse 1
1: In each round B submits the largest available item.
Theorem 19 MaximinReuse 1 is a maximin strategy for CSS(R1, reuse).
PROOF. Consider the union of the two item sets {a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n } and determine the subset containing the c largest items of this set. Assume that this subset consists of items of A and c − items of B. Hence, the solution value of B against G min can be bounded from above by a function of its largest winning item i under S B given by
Now consider the situation in which agent
An upper bound over all strategies S B is given by maximizing over the largest winning item i . Altogether this yields
It is easy to see that line 5 of MaximinReuse 2 performs precisely this optimization task and i * yields the best value for i . Moreover, MaximinReuse 2 guarantees that B actually manages to win at least max i =1,...,nW B (i ), no matter which strategy A pursues. Hence, for an arbitrary strategy of A the output of MaximinReuse 2 is not smaller than an upper bound on a maximin strategy which proves the theorem.
It should be pointed out that MaximinReuse 2 follows a strictly worstcase point of view and may be improved to take advantage of strategies of A deviating from G min . Whenever an item b submitted by B according to line 6 wins a round although there are still items available for A with weight < b , (i.e. A missed a chance to win this round) the algorithm should start from the beginning and recompute item i * for the remaining game. This may lead to an improved solution of B.
Best Response Strategies
We now consider the scenario where B only knows the submission of A in the current round and has to react immediately before both agents move on to the next round. In the following sections we show that for problems CSS(R1, single), CSS(R1, reuse), and CSS(R2, reuse), there is no optimal strategy for B. Indeed we can show that no strategy of B can have a competitive ratio [2] compared to the best off-line strategy better than the golden ratio. Moreover, we show that, under Rule 1, a simple greedy-type algorithm has a worst-case tight competitive ratio of 2 (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). On the other hand, an algorithm yielding an optimal off-line solution for Problem CSS(R2, single) exists (Section 3.2.3).
Note that, in the single-use items case, if B knows in advance the c items A submits (e.g., when n = c), it is easy to devise an optimal response algorithm. This task can be accomplished by solving an off-line maximum weight c-assignment problem (cf. Section 1.2).
Best Response for CSS(R1, single)
Assume B does not know in advance the c items A will submit (i.e., n > c and A not rational). The following lower bound holds for any best response algorithm for CSS(R1, single). f ← f + 1 8:
B submits b and loses An optimal off-line strategy of B would react with b 2 in the first round thus winning both rounds and gaining 2 + 2ε.
Best Response for CSS(R1, reuse)
When items are reusable under Rule 1, we have similar results to the singleuse items case described in Section 3.2.1. In particular, Algorithm Greedy Response 1 guarantees the same competitive ratio.
Theorem 25 Algorithm Greedy Response 1 has a tight competitive ratio of 2 for Problem CSS(R1, reuse).
Observe that, since it does not matter which item is used to lose, the algorithm can be simplified: at each round B tries to win with the largest available item. The proof of Theorem 25 is omitted since that of Theorem 23 applies. Moreover, with the same arguments we can show that the golden ratio lower bound of Theorem 21 holds for Problem CSS(R1, reuse).
Best Response for CSS(R2, single)
As in Rule 1, the following greedy-type algorithm for Rule 2 tries to win against every item submitted by A with the largest possible winning item. If no such item exists, a losing item is determined which can not worsen the remainder of the solution for B. To avoid a tedious special treatment of ties we will assume in this subsection that all 2n items have different weights. A submits item a , remove a from R A 5:
B submits b win and wins, remove b win from R B 9: else 10:
determine the minimum index ≥ 1 such that |A | < |B | PROOF. We will consider round 1, where agent A submits a , and show that also an optimal algorithm Opt can not do better than Greedy Response 2 and that the later does not diminish the range of options for an optimal strategy in the subsequent rounds. Repeating this argument over all rounds yields the statement of the theorem.
Case 1: B wins. What are the alternatives for Opt? If Opt submits an item b j < b win it earns a smaller weight in round 1. In contrary to Greedy Response Rule 2 it can use b win to win in one of the subsequent rounds. However, in this case Greedy Response 2 could submit b j in this future round and win as well since b j < b win . Obviously, the total weight of these two rounds would be the same for both algorithms.
If Opt chooses to submit an item b k ≥ a and loose "voluntarily", it can again use b win to win in a later round. Greedy Response 2 might be forced to loose in that round, but again the two algorithms end up with the same total weight for these two rounds. . Therefore, it is impossible for any strategy that all items in B will win against some items in R A , the items in A being the only candidates for losers.
Since it is impossible for agent B to beat all items in A , but every strict subset of A can be beaten also by items in B −1 , the removal of b does not change the options of Opt in any subsequent round.
Best Response for CSS(R2, reuse)
In this section, we show that for Problem CSS(R2, reuse), no best response strategy of B can have a competitive ratio (compared to the best off-line strategy) better than the golden ratio. as a lower bound for the competitive ratio and thus proves Theorem 27.
Conclusions
In this paper we addressed a multi-agent optimization problem where two agents compete to add items in a solution set. We consider four different versions of the problem and, for all versions, we give results concerning the com-putational complexity, the structure of efficient solutions, and some strategies for optimizing the objective of a single agent against the other.
It is still an open question to determine a Nash Equilibrium, if it exists, for problem CSS(R2, reuse). It seems that the difficulty lies in the definition of strategy in this particular scenario. Another interesting question concerns the design of a best response algorithm again for problem CSS(R2, reuse) with a limited competitive ratio, since an optimal response algorithm does not exist.
This work puts several directions forward for future research. One is the design of algorithms to efficiently enumerate all Pareto-optimal solutions for problem CSS(R2, single). Another is to extend our results to further relevant rules controlling how an agent's item is added to the solution set.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate the problem with incomplete information, i.e. where both agents ignore the weights of the items of the other agent.
